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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2013, American Airlines merged with US Airways creating the largest airline in the world. 
This thesis analyzes this merger’s effect on domestic airline ticket pricing using the Department 
of Transportation’s 10% ticket sample. This analysis focuses on the role of competition, and 
shows that the merged airline was able raise their fares. In addition, legacy carrier were able to 
rose the price when merged companies did not play a role (as either an incumbent or a potential 
entrant).  In markets where the merged companies did play a role, fares for these legacy carriers 
still rose but by less than when these carriers were present.  For low cost carriers in the 
equivalent situations, prices declined. In markets where the merged companies did play a role, 
for low cost carriers, prices declined and those declines were larger when merged companies 
were as incumbents than as potential competitor.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 largely removed US governmental controls over the Airline industry 
for fares and market entry. Since then, more than 50 mergers have taken place in the United States including 
several mega-mergers, like the merger between Delta with Northwest or United with Continental. These 
mergers have dramatically reshaped the airline industry. Out of 12 major airlines operating at the beginning 
of last decades, only 4 of them are still in operation. These 4 airlines surprisingly control about 70% of the 
domestic passenger commercial flight market share [1]. To preserve competition in the passenger airline 
market so as to protect consumers, the Department of Justice has the power to block mergers under antitrust 
regulation. A signal that these laws have been implemented effectively is that, on average, fares have 
declined by about half since the airline industry was deregulated [2]. 
  
The recent mega-merger between American Airlines and US Airways in 2013, created the largest airline 
company in the world, measured by revenue, fleet size, and passenger-kilometer-flown; therefore, 
understanding what changes in fares occurred post-merger and the factors that are particularly correlated 
with those changes is particularly important.  This thesis gives an analysis of fare impacts using the 10% 
ticket survey on legacy and low-cost carriers stemming from the merger as well as investigates how those 
changes were influenced when the market is subject to slot constraints.  We adopt the idea of potential 
competition as described in [3] and test whether the fare impacts they identified in the 1987 merger between 
US Airways and Piedmont are also evident in this recent merger.  
 
There have been a number of studies that have investigated airfare impacts from a variety of causes. [4] 
uses data from 1983 and empirically investigates contestability in the airline industry and concludes that 
they are imperfectly contestable. They also show that both actual and potential competitors reduce fares. 
[5]-[8] all showed using different data over different time frames that when low cost carriers enter a route, 
prices fall. [9] showed that when a low cost carrier exited a market, prices rose.  [10],[11] and [12] again 
showed that when a low cost carrier provides service on a route, prices fall on that route.  They also showed 
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that prices decline on routes that have a low cost carrier providing service at either the origin or the 
destination of the route. [13] showed that prices fall when a new carrier is anticipated on a route and fall 
again if that entry materializes using fare prices over the evolution of Southwest Airlines. [14] examines 
the impact of low cost carriers on price and how those impacts are influenced by the magnitude of service 
they provide.   
 
Our focus is an empirical analysis of the pricing impacts of the US Airways and American Airlines merger. 
Hence analyses in the literature that focus on quantifying the impact of mergers on fare price are particularly 
relevant. For example, [3] examine the impacts of the U.S. Airways and Piedmont merger in 1987. They 
find that the magnitude of fare increases was impacted by whether either or both carriers provided service 
on the route prior to the merger, and secondarily, if either or both provided service to either the origin or 
destination airports on the route. [4] focused on understanding the impact on fares of the Northwest and 
Delta Airlines merger. They concluded that if both carriers provided service on a route prior to the merger, 
the fare impacts were smaller. 
 
The next section describes the data, variables and models used for this analysis. The third section describes 
the empirical results found. The final section gives conclusions and opportunities for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2:DATA, VARIABLES CONSIDERED AND MODELS 
We make use of the Department of Transportation’s Airline Origin and Destination Survey [1].  This survey 
is a 10% sample done on a quarterly basis of passenger tickets.  We focus on tickets that meet the following 
four criteria. First, we only use tickets that were non-stop. There are important differences in service when 
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comparing non-stop to single and multi-stop routes which would have been important to address, had they 
been included.  Second, we focus on tickets that cost more than $10 and less than $2000. These bounds are 
the same as used in [3].  Other authors have suggested other airfare bounds. For example, [4] used a lower 
bound of $25 and no upper bound.   Third, we only include fare records from four legacy carriers and seven 
low cost airlines. The four legacy carriers are US Airways, American Airlines, Delta and United. The seven 
low cost carriers considered are Jet Blue, Frontier, Southwest, Spirit, Allegiant, Sun Country and Virgin 
Atlantic Airlines. Finally, we only consider tickets for which the ticketing carrier and the operating carrier 
are the same. 
 
We make use of ten fields in the DB1B database: market, year, quarter, ticketing carrier, origin airport, 
destination airport, passengers, market fare and market distance. With the date and the market information, 
we identify whether the origin or destination airports are slot constrained.  We also compute the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each market in the appropriate quarter. HHI is a widely accepted measurement 
of market concentration.  
 
We also make use of six dummy variables to described whether US Airways and/or American Airways was 
providing service on that particular route at that time as well as whether one, the other or both were potential 
competitors. This yields the following six variables: two-zero, one-one, zero-two, one-zero, zero-one and 
zero-zero. For example, two-zero indicates that both American Airlines and US Airways were providing 
service on the route; hence neither was a potential competitor on that route (because they were both 
incumbents). In contrast zero-two indicates that neither were providing service on the route however, both 
were providing service on other routes that used either the origin and/or destination airports for the route. 
This is the same as described in [3]. 
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The model, ignoring the concepts of incumbent and potential competition pre and post-merger, is given in 
Equation (1) below.  
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2ln⁡(𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽7𝑄2 +
𝛽8𝑄3 + 𝛽9𝑄4 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡       (1) 
 
where 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡is the one-way fare from origin airport i to destination airport j in time period t, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗⁡is the 
distance between origin airport i and destination airport j,⁡𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index in time 
period t on the direct route from airport i to airport j, 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable that equals one if airport 
i or airport j or both are slot constrained (where JFK, Newark, LaGuardia and Reagan National are defined 
as slot constrained), 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if time period t is after the merger and is 
zero otherwise, and 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 is a dummy variable that equals one if the carrier is either United Airlines or 
Delta Airlines and is zero otherwise. 𝐿𝐶𝐶 is a dummy variable that equals one if the carrier is one of the 
five low cost carriers and is zero otherwise. 𝑄2, 𝑄3, and 𝑄4 are dummy variables that indicate if the record 
is for quarters 2, 3 or 4, respectively. 
 
The baseline model given in Equation (1) is extended to include the concept of potential competition as 
given in Equation (2) below. 
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽7𝑄2 +
𝛽8𝑄3 + 𝛽9𝑄4 + 𝛽10𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽17𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽19𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 +
𝛽20𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽21𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶    (2) 
  9 
 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of carriers that provide service to airport i and or airport j in time period t but 
do not provide service from airport i to airport j and 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if there are m incumbents and n potential entrants in the market from origin airport i to 
destination airport j in time period t and is zero otherwise. The full set of 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 variables has six 
different categories [3], but we only use four of them in these models. There are effectively no markets that 
fit the description of 𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡, hence they are discarded.  
 
Notice that in the extended model, we attempt to understand how the presence of US Airways and/or 
American affected prices post-merger when they were either an actual or a potential competitor prior to the 
merger; and how these impacts might have varied if the competing carrier was either a legacy carrier 
(United or Delta) or a low cost carrier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
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Both models were fit using 2011 and 2015 or 2011 and 2016 data to assess whether impacts are more 
persistent or transitive in nature. The coefficients for all four models are given in Table 1. It is useful to 
notice that many of the coefficients are very similar across both sets of models implying that the general 
trends of the impacts of the merger generally persisted over the two-year period. 
 
Table 1: Estimated Coefficients 
Variable AY 11-15 Base Model 
(AY11-16 Base Model) 
AY 11-15 Extended Model 
(AY11-16 Extended Model) 
Intercept 2.24*** (2.12***) 1.81*** (1.7***) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) 0.446*** (0.468***) 0.472*** (0.488***) 
𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡) 0.436*** (0.537***) 0.39*** (0.505***) 
𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 0.07*** (0.073**) 0.079*** (0.080***) 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.096*** (0.02) 0.126*** (0.038**) 
𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 -0.039** (-0.039 **) -0.0444***(-0.042**) 
𝐿𝐶𝐶 -0.521*** (-0.533***) -0.532*** (-0.542***) 
𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.023 (0.050**) 0.662*** (0.669***) 
𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.289*** (-0.272***) -0.5*** (-0.598***) 
𝑄2 -0.022**(-0.049***) -0.020*(-0.046***) 
𝑄3 -0.072***(-0.063***) -0.090***(-0.058***) 
𝑄4 -0.058***(-0.0263**) -0.076***(-0.019*) 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡  -0.0429***(-0.040***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡  0.565***(0.561***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡  0.596*** (0.595***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡  0.618*** (0.613***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇
∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 
 -0.694***(-0.649***)   
𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇
∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 
 -0.668***(-0.649***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇
∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 
 -0.652***(-0.635***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶  0.0339 (0.190***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶  0.298***(0.422***) 
𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶  0.321***(0.454***) 
Adjusted R2 0.279 (0.273) 0.31 (0.317) 
(*,**,***significant at .01, .001 and .0001, respectively) 
 
Consistent with other studies, we find that higher HHI, which implies higher industry concentration, is 
associated with higher fares. At a national scale and very approximately, the coefficient on HHI implies 
that there is approximately a 40-50% increase in fares when the number of carriers declines from five equal 
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size carriers to a single carrier.  We also find, again similar to other studies that prices are generally about 
7% higher at slot-constrained airports and that prices are generally higher for legacy carriers in contrast to 
low cost carriers.  
 
It is useful to notice that the coefficient for the variable post is positive in all four models indicating that 
prices rose after the merger.  In only one model the significance for that coefficient is 0.15. In contrast, in 
the other three models, the significance level is better than 0.001. In comparison with 2011, the merged 
carrier’s fares were about 12% higher in 2015 but that difference was only about 4% in 2016 (in comparison 
to 2011).  Not unexpectedly, based on the extended model, fares decrease with an increasing number of 
potential entrants (about 4% per additional potential entrant). 
 
Table 2, using the extended model, gives the % change in fares (for 2015 and 2016 in comparison to 2011) 
for the merged carrier, the two legacy carriers and low cost carriers. For the other legacy carriers and the 
low cost carriers, the estimates are different based on the role American Airlines and US Airways played 
in the market prior to the merger. 
 
Table 2: Change in Fares Relative to 2011 
Carrier Group 2015 2016 
Merged Carrier (AA) 13.43% 3.87% 
United/Delta w/o AA/USAir in Mkt 119.90% 102.79% 
United/Delta with (2,0) 9.86% 5.97% 
United/Delta with (1,1) 12.75% 5.97% 
United/Delta with (0,2) 14.57% 7.47% 
LCC w/o AA/USAir -31.20% -42.88% 
LCC with (2,0) -28.83% -30.93% 
LCC with (1,1) -7.32% -12.89% 
LCC with (0,2) -5.16% -10.06% 
                (incumbent, potential entrant) 
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On routes where US Airways and American Airlines were not an incumbent or a potential entrant Delta 
and United raised prices and low cost carriers reduced prices on average (about 120% and -30%, in 2015 
in comparison to 2011, for example).  
 
The increase in fares by United and Delta in these markets, on the surface, is quite interesting. About 1% 
of the markets fit into this category; that is where United and/or Delta operated but nether American or US 
Airways was an incumbent or potential entrant.  In 2011, the average airline fares in these markets was 
about 65% higher in comparison to all markets. In 2015, it was about 125% higher and in 2016, they were 
138% higher.  Overwhelmingly these markets connect two small airports. Further, in more than 90% of 
these markets there is only one carrier.  
 
In markets where American Airlines and/or US Airways were an incumbent or a potential entrant, low cost 
carriers reduced prices post-merger and those reductions were highest where both American Airlines and 
US Airways were incumbents and least when they were both potential entrants.  More specifically, when 
both were incumbents, prices fell by about 29% in 2015 (in comparison to 2011) and the comparison 
between 2016 prices and 2011 was essentially the same. When both American and US Airways were 
potential entrants, the decline in 2015 (in comparison to 2011) was only about 5%.  This decline did 
continue, however, into 2016 with a total average decline of about 10% from 2011 to 2016. 
 
In contrast, for other legacy carriers (Delta and United), on routes where US and/or American played a role 
pre-merger, prices rose in 2015 but those increases did not fully persist into 2016, with the increases from 
2011 to 2016 being about half of those estimated from 2011 to 2015.  For example, when both US Airways 
and American were incumbents, fares of the other legacy carriers rose by about 10% in 2015 (in comparison 
to 2011).  When both carriers were potential entrants, fares rose by about 15% (in comparison to 2011). 
These same increases were about 6% and 7.5% in 2016 in comparison to 2011. It is useful to notice that the 
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presence of US Airways and American as incumbents was more effective at suppressing price increases by 
these legacy carriers then when they were both potential entrants. 
 
As an example of the dichotomy between legacy and low cost carriers price setting behavior, in 2011 the 
average (one-way) fares from Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) to San Francisco, CA (SFO) was $159 on 
Southwest and it declined to $154 in 2015.  For that same market, the average fare rose on United from 
$170 in 2011 to $199 in 2015. As another example, in 2011 the fare from Nantucket, MA (ACK) to 
Washington, DC, (DCA) on US Airways was $198 and it jumped to $243 in 2015. In contrast, on Jet Blue, 
the fare declined from $233 in 2011 to $104 in 2015.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis describes an analysis that makes use of the 10% ticket sample to gain insight into the impact of 
the mega merger of US Airways and American Airlines on ticket prices. This analysis confirmed insights 
that have been gained in prior analysis including where there is heightened competition, prices are lower. 
It also demonstrates again that mergers can cause prices to rise. What is perhaps novel is that while legacy 
carriers generally increased prices post-merger, low cost carriers did not appear to have that same freedom.  
Rather, they lowered prices and those fare reductions were largest in markets for which American Airlines 
and US Airways played a larger role pre-merger. 
 
It is useful to extend this research in several different directions. First, these models ignored the role that 
hubs and focus cities play in airline networks. There is extensive empirical evidence to suggest that hubs 
do affect fare prices hence integrating this into the statistical models is very useful. Second, these models 
focused on direct service only.  Extending the models to include one-hop and multi-hop tickets is very 
important.  Third, there is some evidence that when competing carries provide service at nearby airports 
that also suppresses prices [15]. Our focus for potential competition is on carriers that service one or both 
airports in a market but that do not serve the market itself. Extending that definition to include nearby 
airports is likely to be valuable.      
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